

Lecturer

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- University of Bergen, Norway
 - 14500 students, 3200 faculty and staff
- Visiting NII 3 December 2011 – 4 February 2012
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About the lecture series


- 1 Specifying and verifying state-transition models for multi-agent systems
- 2 Social laws for coordination
- 3 Dealing with non-compliance
- 4 Coordinating self-interested agents
- 5 Social laws design as an optimisation problem, and as an optimisation problem
- 6 Reasoning about social laws
- 7 Strategic reasoning under imperfect information

Multi-agent systems


- Consists of several *autonomous agents* that *interact*
- An agent is an entity that *perceives the environment*, and *acts*
- An *agent* can be an (artificially) *intelligent agent program*
- But can also be a simple component of some system, like a thermostat

Formal models of multi-agent systems


- State-transition models
- Quite common abstraction
 - Ex.: UML



Example: microwave oven




Computations: example



Adding agents

- If the system is a *multi-agent system*, the states are *global states*
- We label the transitions with the *name of the agent* that causes the transition by executing some *action*
- This assumes *asynchronous action*



Formally

An **agent-labelled Kripke structure** (over Φ) is a 6-tuple:

$$K = \langle S, S^0, R, Ag, \alpha, V \rangle, \text{ where}$$

- S is a finite, non-empty set of states,
- $S^0 \subseteq S$ ($S^0 \neq \emptyset$) is the set of initial states;
- $R \subseteq S \times S$ is a total (each state has a successor) binary transition relation on S ;
- $Ag = \{1, \dots, n\}$ is the set of agents;
- $\alpha : R \rightarrow Ag$ labels each transition in R with an agent
- $V : S \rightarrow 2^\Phi$ labels states with a set of propositional atoms

Note: simplifying assumption: single agent execute single action in each state (*interleaved concurrency*)

Introduction

- Consider this statement:

The microwave can only start without error if it is closed

Is it true in our microwave model?

- This statement is true in *some* models (including ours), but false in others
- We want to be able to check whether such properties hold or not *automatically*
- Thus we need *a precise way of writing down statements*
- For that we can use modal logic, and in particular *Computation Tree Logic (CTL)*

CTL: language

The language of CTL (CTL formulas) is defined as follows:

- Propositional atoms such as p or *started* are formulas
- Formulas can be combined using propositional connectives such as \wedge (and), \vee (or), \neg (not), \rightarrow (implication), etc.
- We can construct new formulas by putting **temporal connectives** in front of an existing formula. If φ and ψ are formulas, then the following are also formulas:

$E\bigcirc\varphi$ on some path, φ is true next

$E(\varphi\mathcal{U}\psi)$ on some path, φ until ψ

$E\blacklozenge\varphi$ on some path, eventually φ

$E\Box\varphi$ on some path, always φ

$A\bigcirc\varphi$ on all paths, φ is true next

$A(\varphi\mathcal{U}\psi)$ on all paths, φ until ψ

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$A\Box\varphi$ on all paths, always φ

Examples

- $E\bigcirc error$ (it is possible that there is an error in the next state)
- $\neg A\bigcirc error$ (it is not necessary that there is an error in the next state)
- $E\diamond warm$ (it is possible that the oven will eventually be warm)
- $A\Box \neg(warm \wedge error)$ (it is necessary that the microwave can never be both warm and have an error)
- $A\diamond closed$ (it is necessary that the microwave will eventually be closed)
- $A(\neg warm \cup closed)$ (it is necessary that the microwave is cold until it is closed)
- $A\Box(\neg closed \rightarrow \neg E\bigcirc(start \wedge \neg error))$ (the microwave can only start without error if it is closed)

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Examples

- $A \square (A \diamond \textit{enabled})$ (the process is infinitely often enabled)
- $A \square (A \diamond \textit{deadlock})$ (the process will eventually be in a permanent deadlock)
- $A \square (E \diamond \textit{restart})$ (it is always possible to get to the restart-state)
- $A \square \neg (c_1 \wedge c_2)$ (safety)
- $A \square (t_1 \rightarrow \square \diamond c_1)$ (liveness)

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Formal interpretation


Given a Kripke model K , a state s in K and a CTL formula φ ,

$$K, s \models \varphi$$


means that φ is true (or satisfied) in state s of K .

E○

E○ = for **some** path, in the **next** state




Example: $E \bigcirc$



$$K, s \models E \bigcirc error$$


Example: $A\bigcirc$




$$K, s \models A\bigcirc \neg \text{warm}$$

E◇

E◇ = for **some** path, in **some future** state




Example: $E\Diamond$




$$K, s \models E\Diamond warm$$

A◇

A◇ = for **all** paths, in **some future** state



Example: $A\Diamond$




$K, s \models A\Diamond closed$




E

E = for **some** path, in **all future** states



Example: $E \square$




$K, s \models E \square \neg warm$




A □

A □ = for **all** paths, in **all future** states




Example: A \square




$$K, s \models A \square \neg(\text{warm} \wedge \text{error})$$

AU

AU = for **all** paths, ψ becomes true in some future states and φ is true in **all states before that**




Example: $\square U$



$$K, s \models A(\neg\text{warm } U \text{ closed})$$



Example: nesting



$$K, s \models E \bigcirc E \bigcirc (closed \wedge error)$$

Notation

We use

$$K \models \varphi$$

to denote the fact that $K, s \models \varphi$ for all initial states $s \in S_0$.

Some equivalences

- $\varphi \vee \psi \equiv \neg(\neg\varphi \wedge \neg\psi)$
- $A\bigcirc\varphi \equiv \neg E\bigcirc\neg\varphi$
- $E\diamond \equiv E(\top \mathcal{U} \varphi)$
- $A\Box\varphi \equiv \neg E\diamond\neg\varphi$
- $A(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi) \equiv \neg(E(\neg\psi \mathcal{U} \neg(\varphi \vee \psi)) \vee E\Box\neg\psi)$

That means that we only need the operators
 $\{\top, \neg, \wedge, E\Box, E\mathcal{U}, E\bigcirc\}$!

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Contents

- 1 General Introduction
- 2 Kripke Models
- 3 CTL
- 4 ATL**
- 5 Model checking

ATL

- *Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL)* is an agentized extension of CTL introduced by Alur and colleagues (1997)
- The language of ATL is obtained by replacing A and E with $\langle\langle C \rangle\rangle$ where $C \subseteq Ag$ and Ag is the finite set of all agents in the system
- Intuitively,

$$\langle\langle C \rangle\rangle \diamond \varphi$$

means that

- C can cooperate to ensure that φ becomes true sometime in the future no matter what the other agents do (and similarly for \bigcirc , \square , \mathcal{U})
- C has a strategy to enforce that φ becomes true sometime in the future
- Is used to reason about *game-like* distributed systems

Example

$$\langle\langle merkel, sarkozy \rangle\rangle \diamond \neg crisis$$

Merkel and Sarkozy can cooperate to ensure that at some point in the future the crisis is over

Example

$\langle\langle Ann \rangle\rangle \square \langle\langle Bob \rangle\rangle \diamond win$

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Formal specification and verification

- Traditional verification methods such as *simulation* or *testing* are **not exhaustive**, they don't explore all possible behaviours of the system
- **Formal verification** methods **do**, and they can therefore give a *guarantee* that the design does not have any errors
- We **specify** the properties we want to check that the system has as a formula in some **formal logic**
 - Example: $A \square (t_1 \rightarrow A \diamond c_1)$ (liveness)
- Two main techniques:
 - **Proof-based**: describe also the system using formal logic, and try to find a formal **proof** that the property follows
 - **Model-based**: describe the system using a mathematical structure, and use an algorithm to check whether the property holds

Reasoning: satisfiability

- The *satisfiability problem* is as follows:
Given a formula φ is there some interpretation that makes φ true?
- How hard is the satisfiability problem?
 - For *Coalition Logic*: *PSPACE-complete* (Pauly, 2001).
 - For *CTL*: *EXPTIME-complete* – a lower bound for ATL.

Reasoning with ATL: Satisfiability

Theorem (van Drimmelen, 2003)

For **any fixed set of agents** Ag , satisfiability for ATL formulae over Ag is EXPTIME-complete.

But if the set of agents is not fixed, van Drimmelen's algorithm is 2EXPTIME.

Theorem (Walther, Lutz, Wolter, Wooldridge, 2006)

The satisfiability problem for **arbitrary** ATL formulae is EXPTIME-complete (and hence no harder than CTL).

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

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Model checking

- Successful model-based verification technique
- Input: K, φ
- Output: yes if $K \models \varphi$
- Effective algorithms exist

Model checking



$A \square (A \diamond \text{enabled})$

Input: model and formula

"yes"

"no"



Output: "no" and a counterexample
(sequence of states where the property does not hold)


Model checking: complexity

Model checking CTL and ATL can be done in time **polynomial in the size of the formula and the number of states in the model**


... if the model is **explicitly represented**

Explicit representation

- Explicit representation is *often not feasible*
- Number of states *increase exponentially* with the number of independent variables



2 independent variables



Model representation languages

- *Practical* model checkers use *high-level* model specification languages.
- *Reactive modules*: a rule-based language for model specification. . .

```
module toggle controls  $x$ 
  init
  []  $T \rightarrow x' := T$ 
  []  $T \rightarrow x' := \perp$ 
  update
  []  $x \rightarrow x' := \perp$ 
  []  $(\neg x) \rightarrow x' := T$ 
```

Practical model checking

The complexity of model checking depends on the *specification language* and the *representation of the model*.

Theorem (van der Hoek, Lomuscio, Wooldridge, AAMAS06)

For Reactive Modules models, model checking is exactly as hard as theorem proving in the corresponding language:

<i>ATL</i>	<i>EXPTIME-complete</i>
<i>Coalition Logic</i>	<i>PSPACE-complete</i>
<i>prop logic</i>	<i>co-NP-complete</i>