

Digital Forensics 2.0

**SBA Research &
Vienna University of Technology**

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secure.sba-research.org

COMET
Competence Centers for
Excellent Technologies

bmVIT
Bundesministerium
für Verkehr,
Innovation und Technologie

bmWF
Bundesministerium für
Wirtschaft, Familie und Jugend

CD
Christian Doppler
Forschungsgesellschaft

FFG

wirtschaftsagentur zit
Die Technologieagentur
der Stadt Wien

Overview

- Definition
- Digital Evidence
- How is a forensic investigation done today?
- What are future challenges?

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Definition

- Forensic science is generally defined as the application of science to the law.
- “Digital forensics, also known as computer and network forensics, has many definitions. Generally, it is considered the application of science to the identification, collection, examination, and analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a strict chain of custody for the data”
- Source: NIST SP 800-86



Digital Evidence

- Growing importance since life becomes digital.
- Movies, series: CSI, ...
- Research papers: iPhone & Android Forensics, Cloud Forensics, Social Network Forensics, ...
- Becomes important for companies, budget increases

Digital Evidence

- Corporate Governance creates new responsibilities
 - Some person / department has to address information security.
 - Incident response is part of information security management
 - Management want explanations about what happened
- ISMS requires traceability of incidents



Digital Evidence


- White-collar crime often uses computers / networks
- Companies realize the potential losses such as
 - Media companies (music, movies, ...)
 - Software license
 - Employees using company equipment used privately



Increased Perception

- Sabu / Lulzsec, Anonymous, ...
- „Cyber Warriors“, such as United States Cyber Command in .us, ...
- „Cyber Defense“
 - 1600 in Austria, LKA / BKA
 - CCC in Germany
 - Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE) by NATO in Tallinn ...)

Guide to Integration Forensic Techniques into Incident Response (NIST 800-86)



Data Collection

- Identifying possible sources of data
- Acquiring the data
 - Develop a plan to acquire the data
 - Likely Value
 - Volatility
 - Amount of Effort Required
 - Acquire the data
 - Verify the integrity of the data



Reporting

- Alternative Explanations
- Audience Consideration
- Actionable Information



Recommendations


- Organizations should perform forensics using a consistent process
- Analysts should be aware of the range of possible data sources
- Organizations should be proactive in collecting useful data
- Analysts should perform data collection using a standard process
- Analysts should use a methodical approach to studying the data
- Analysts should review their processes and practices



Different Methods

Methods depend on the task at hand

- What needs to be examined?
 - Which question should be answered?
 - Which artifacts are (still) available?
- Which tools?
 - Depends on data
- Which methods?
 - Is this a court case or do you (only) need to know where to focus your attention?




Example

Brandstiftung: WU- Gebäude muss schließen
Der Standard, 15.12.2005, Seite 1

Brandstiftung: WU-Gebäude muss schließen

Wien – Brandstiftung ist nach ersten Ermittlungen der Polizei die Ursache für ein Feuer in der Wiener Wirtschaftsuniversität (WU), das den Uni-Betrieb in Turbulenzen stürzt. In der Nacht von Dienstag auf Mittwoch wurde an vier Stellen des Gebäudes in Wien-Alsergrund Feuer gelegt. Vor allem die Bibliothek ist dadurch schwer beschädigt worden, 20.000 Bücher wurden zerstört. Nach Einschätzung der Uni-Leitung bleiben die Bibliothek und das Hauptgebäude, die von rund 21.000 Studierenden benutzt werden, zumindest bis Ende der Woche geschlossen. [red] **S. 13**



Methods

Timeline Analysis


- Reconstruct series of events
- Data sources
 - Meta data on file system
 - Can sometime be recovered for deleted data
 - MAC time stamp

Time Stamps

- Last access to a file
 - M odified (last write)
 - A ccessed (write/read also modified for read-only)
 - C reated / changed (modification of attributes)
- Copy / Move may behave differently
- Unix / Windows behave differently
- Users, malware, programs can modify time stamp (e.g. touch, Total Commander)

Time Stamps

- Strange behavior when copying/moving files in NTFS
- Copy: M-time is before C-time
- Identification of source and target possible
- However: A-Time is not updated on Vista and NTFS by default (`NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate = 1`)
- Linux mount flag `noatime`



FAT and NTFS


ACTION	LAST MODIFIED DATE-TIME	LAST ACCESSED DATE-TIME	CREATED DATE-TIME
File moved within a volume	Unchanged	Unchanged	Unchanged
File moved across volumes	Unchanged	Updated	Updated
File copied (destination file)	Unchanged	Updated	Updated

Timeline Analysis

- For each file it is possible to reconstruct what happened
 - Dropbox pack rat feature
 - When was file written, modified, change history
 - Was the file modified after accessing a Web site

Volume Snapshot Service

- Source <http://www.howtogeek.com/howto/11130/restore-previous-versions-of-files-in-every-edition-of-windows-7/>



The screenshot shows the "Events" section of the Dropbox interface. The title "Dropbox" is at the top. Below it is a header with a back arrow, the word "Events", a dropdown menu for "Dropbox", and a date selector set to "2/19/2013".

A message states: "Events gives you a timeline of everything that's happened in your Dropbox since the beginning of time."

The "My devices" section lists all devices with access to the account:

Name	Country	Most recent activity
NBATVIE080	Austria	in the last hour
Edgar-Weipplis-MacBook-Pro-SSD SBA	Austria	in the last hour
Kathrin Lenovo WSP	Austria	in the last hour
Edgar's Air	Austria	in the last hour
Edgar's Mac Book white home	Austria	in the last hour
iPhone	N/A	N/A
Android	N/A	N/A
iPad	N/A	N/A

A specific entry for "Edgar's Air" is highlighted with a blue rounded rectangle. Inside this rectangle, the "Version: 1.6.16" and "IP address: 89.144.192.70" details are shown.

Internet Explorer History

- **Http-Auth:** %APPDATA%\Microsoft\ Credentials, in encrypted files
- **Form-based:** HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage1 encrypted with the same password
- http://securityxploded.com/iepassworddecryptor.php



Network Traffic

- Rootkits can hide processes, files
- Do not trust the operating system
- Data traffic is difficult to hide
- SSL – man in the middle
- TCPDump (IP address, ports, content)

Example

- For our example:
 - No network traffic available
 - Only two laptop recovered

Keyword Search

- Search in
 - Files
 - Empty space
 - Swap files, swap partitions
 - RAM

For key words; use word lists...

- E.g. strings RAMDump.bin | grep DVDRip

**Search for
„Kanister“
(fuel can)**

```

1659129 DS[K
1659130 X32,*  

1659131 [ ]8?9GEZF
1659132 U4<Z
1659133 WZG]
1659134 G) .:0
1659135 JX.9DUAN
1659136 US/G
1659137 QZZG
1659138 L,9;*
1659139 IX=8[GMC
1659140 K+]
1659141 8\#0
1659142 263(4
1659143 <td nowrap class="sortcol">Do 23.06</td>
1659144 <td>23k</td>
1659145 </tr>
1659146 <tr class="msggold style="background-color:#F6F6F6">
1659147 <td align=center valign="middle"><input type="checkbox" name="Mid" value="1" />
1659148 <td nowrap>
1659149 <span style="width:16px;height:16px;display:inline-block;"><spacer type="block" width="16px" height="16px" />
1659150 <td>
1659151 <td>
1659152 <td align=right>&ampnbsp</td>
1659153 <td>
1659154 r eBay-Kauf - Artikelnummer 5208757266, Notebook Acer...
1659155 </a>
1659156 </td>
1659157 <td nowrap class="sortcol">Mo 20.06</td>
1659158 <td>6k</td>
1659159 </tr>
1659160 <tr class="msggold style="background-color:#F6F6F6">
1659161 <td align=center valign="middle"><input type="checkbox" name="Mid" value="1" />
1659162 <td nowrap>
1659163 <span style="width:16px;height:16px;display:inline-block;"><spacer type="block" width="16px" height="16px" />

```

For Help, pre [Ln 1659128, Col. 9, CW] UNIX Mod: 15.05.2007 12:24:46 File Size: 62575121 IN5

Do 23.06 23k □ Re: Ihre Zahlungshinweise f r eBay-Kauf - Artikelnummer
[5208757266](#), Notebook Acer... Mo 20.06 6k □ eBay-Mitglied: Ihre
 Zahlungshinweise f r eBay-Kauf - Artikelnummer 5208757266, Notebook Acer 18... Mo 20.06 5k □
 Auktionsende@ebay.at eBay - Verkaufter Artikel: Notebook Acer 1804 3,2GHZ neu ab ? 1.- (Profiger
 t)... So 19.06 29k □ [Einladung zu den Infotagen im Business & Research Center](#)
 H chst dtplatz Di 08.03 9k □ [Actuality Agent Leere Lokale](#) Fr 04.03 17k
 □ [Business & Research Center H chst dtplatz](#) Do 17.02 7k □
 watchnotice@ebay.com Beobachtetes Angebot endet bald! - 6 Stk. Kanister ? 10 Liter, sauber! Di 15.02
 16k □ gleicheArtikel@ ebay.at eBay - Artikellempfehlungen: MB/Hanomag Henschel 207 Wohnmob
 So 06.02 30k □ [Windenergie](#) Fr 28.01 2k □ Gebotbestaetigt@ ebay.at
 eBay - Gebot best tigt: 4 Stk. Kanister 25 Liter, leer, sauber! (Artikelnummer... Mi 26.01 21k □
[Leere Lokale/Standortsuche](#) Mi 19.01 1208k □ AW:
 Frage zum Artikel mit der Nr.: 4516477505 - Mobilheim 6 m x 3 m, 2 Zimmer, n... Mi 05.01 25k □
 aw-confirm@ebay.com [Frage zum Artikel mit der Nr.: 4516477505 - Mobilheim 6 m x 3 m, 2 Zimmer, n...](#)
 E... Mi 05.01 17k □ [142472556 / weiteres Angebot](#) Mo 03.01 2k
 □ [142472556 / weiteres Angebot](#) Mo 27.12 2k □
[Actuality Agent Leere Lokale](#) Do 23.12 6k □ [142472556 / aktueller Stand](#) Mo 20.12 2k □

Example

- Arson?
 - Bid to buy a fuel can
- No proof but indicates that further investigation makes sense
- Investigation is usually time-bounded.



Reconstruction of Data


Deleted files

- Trivial
 - Only reference to file is deleted
 - Files are marked as deleted
 - Files can be recovered with high probability
 - Also applies to cameras, smartphones, ...
- Advanced
 - You create a document, other processes in the background do other stuff, you add data to your document.
 - What happens if you use a secure delete on the file?



Copy-On-Write File System (e.g. BTRFS) or some SSDs

- Document can be recovered



File Carving


- Search for characteristic signatures of files
 - JPEG files start with 0xffd8 and end with 0xffd9
- Tools such as Foremost look for these signatures

Example

- Let's get back to our example:
 - A file could be found (as deleted)
 - No new additional evidence could be found

Internet Browser History

- Tool Pasco
 - Cached Files are stored in index.dat (Internet Explorer)
 - Pasco can extract these and display results
- Details: Keith J. Jones, 2003, „Forensic Analysis of Internet Explorer Activity Files“



More Sources


- Look at other commonly used programs
 - E-Mail (Outlook, mbox) with tools such as `scanpst`
- Google Desktop Search
 - Benjamin Turnbull et.al. , “Google desktop as a source of digital evidence”, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Fall 2006, Volume 5, Issue 1

Windows Desktop Search

- Installed by default since Vista
- File Windows.edb
- Tools: esedbtools, EseDbViewer
- File location: %Profiles%/All Users/Application Data/Microsoft/Search/Data/Applications/Windows/
- May contain entire files or parts such as e-mails, documents,
- Paper by Joachim Metz, „Forensic analysis of the Windows Search database”

Last Commands and Applications Started

- Last commands and applications executed by a user (eg. Windows User Assist Key)
- “HKEY_USER\<sid>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist \{5E6AB780-7743-11CF-A12B-00AA004AE837}\Count”
- “Encrypted” with ROT13 cipher:
“T:\rapnfr3.rkr” -> “g:\encase3.exe”
 - set “NoEncrypt=1” to stop encrypting and “NoLog=1” to stop logging altogether



Windows User Assist Key Analysis (Windows 7)


Source: <http://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/01/18/quickpost-windows-7-beta-rot13-replaced-with-vigenere-great-joke/>

- “Weak ROT13 crypto has been replaced with “stronger” Vigenère crypto!”
- “The Vigenère key I found through some basic cryptanalysis is WHQNKT EZYFS LMRGXADU JOPIVC.”
- “To the Microsoft developer who designed this: great joke! You really made me laugh. Seriously.”



Registry Ripper (RegRipper)

- Files played in media player
 - “HKEY_USERS\<sid>\Software\Microsoft\MediaPlayer\Player\RecentURLList”
- ZIP Files opened/saved with “common dialog”
 - “HKEY_USER\<sid>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explore\ComDlg32\OpenSaveMRU\zip”
- “<sid>” = Security Identifier of user
- RegRipper: <http://regripper.wordpress.com>





```

UltraEdit - C:\Users\Project\Downloads\RegRipper.brf
File Edit Search Insert Project View Format Column Macro Scripting Advanced Window Help
Open Explorer Lists Filter: **
Logon User Name
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
LastWrite Time [Fri Sep 2 10:28:21 2005 (UTC)]
Logon User Name = j.mustermann
-----
Software\Microsoft\Search Assistant\ACMru not found.
-----
AdobeReader v.20080324
Adobe Acrobat Reader version not found.
-----
Software\America Online\AOL Instant Messenger (THO\CurrentVersion\Users not fo
-----
Applets
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets
LastWrite Time Mon Apr 18 18:33:34 2005 (UTC)
-----
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Paint\Recent File List not f
-----
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Applets\Regedit
LastWrite Time Mon Jul 18 08:59:36 2005 (UTC)
RegEdit LastKey value -> 值名:否
-----
cmdline32 v.20080324
ComDlg32\LastVisitedMRU
**All values printed in MRUList order.
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\LastVisitedMRU
LastWrite Time Thu Sep 1 11:44:30 2005 (UTC)
MRUList = bbfefedc
b -> H:\NOBACKUP\BurnDvd24\iexplore.exe
b -> H:\NOBACKUP\BurnDvd24\SW1\winzip32.exe
g -> H:\NOBACKUP\BurnDvd23\emule.exe
f -> E:\Diagnostic.EXE
e -> E:\videofixer.exe
d -> H:\NOBACKUP\od57dvd\Reamon.exe

```

More traces...

- Prefetch files (Win XP)
- Deleted images (with foremost)
- IE password / account / autocomplete recovery
 - IE Passview
 - OWADE
- Spooler files
 - Contains pages printed
www.prnwatch.com



OWADE

The slide features a central grid of icons representing various data types. On the left, there are icons for a hard drive ('disk'), a disk image, the Windows Registry, WiFi signal strength ('WiFi info'), multiple files ('Files'), and hardware information ('Hardware info'). To the right, there are icons for Windows credentials (key and lock), a blue 'S' logo, and cloud storage ('Cloud data') represented by servers and globe icons. Below the grid, the text 'Credentials and data' and 'Cloud data' is centered.

Source: <http://www.slideshare.net/jmichel.p/owade>

Geolocation / WLAN


- Info stored for each access point
 - Mac address (BSSID)
 - Key (encrypted)
 - Last time of access
- Wifi data are stored in
 - Registry (XP)
 - XML file and Registry (Vista/7)

The screenshot shows the Windows Control Panel's Network and Sharing Center. It displays a list of current connections under the heading 'Currently connected to'. The list includes 'HomeNet' (Local and Internet access, Connected), 'Dial-up and VPN', 'Dial-up Connection', 'Wireless Network Connection', 'HomeNet' (Connected), 'HomeNetWIMax', 'HameedNet', and 'suleng'. Each connection entry has a small icon and a signal strength bar.

Source: <http://www.slideshare.net/jmichel.p/owade>

Let's get back to our example

- Analyze hard drive
IE history (Pasco, index.dat)
- We could show that suspect had access to Web mail account of sender.
- Username/PW Kombination for Web mail account were found and still valid.



derStandard.at | Panorama | Wien

**25. Juli 2007
20:22 MESZ**

Nachlese: Bibliothek vom Brand am stärksten betroffen - eine Ansichtssache



Sechs Jahre Haft für WU-Brandstifter
Für die Richterin stand fest: Den "großen Unbekannten" Angeklagte hat den verheerenden Brand gelegt

Wien - Natürlich muss sich der Prozessbeobachter die Finniemand für Rudolf S. ein psychiatrisches Gutachten geben der Mann, der am Mittwoch wegen der Brandstiftung in Wirtschaftsuniversität (nicht rechtskräftig) zu sechs Jahren worden ist, hat während der vier Prozesstage mitunter

Anonyme Mails

Dass auf seinem Laptop Texte gefunden worden sind, die große Ähnlichkeiten mit zwei anonymen Bekennermails an die Kriminalpolizei haben, wiegt schon schwerer. Vor allem, weil darin Details standen, die öffentlich nicht bekannt waren. Und dass der Sachverständige auch noch die Zugangsdaten für die E-mail-Adresse, von der die beiden Botschaften verschickt worden sind, auf dem Laptop entdeckt hat, machte die Verurteilung praktisch fix.

<http://derstandard.at/druck/?id=2972033>

Friend-in-the-middle (FITM) attacks

SNS user


SNS provider


Friend in the Middle

- 1 Sniff active session
- 2 Cloned HTTP session
- 3 Extract account content
- 4 Spam & phishing emails

- Hijack social networking sessions
- Attack surface: unencrypted WLAN traffic, LAN, router etc.
- User impersonation

Markus Huber, Martin Mulazzani, Manuel Leithner, Sebastian Schrittweiser, Gilbert Wondracek, and Edgar R. Weippl. **Social snapshots: Digital forensics for online social networks**. In Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 12 2011.









Access to Data

Element	Download	social snapshot
Contact details	—	✓ Crawler
News feed	—	✓ Graph API
Checkins	—	✓ Graph API
Photo Tags	—	✓ Graph API
Video Tags	—	✓ Graph API
Friends	name only ^a	✓ Graph API
Likes	name only ^a	✓ Graph API
Movies	name only ^a	✓ Graph API
Music	name only ^a	✓ Graph API
Books	name only ^a	✓ Graph API
Groups	name only ^a	✓ Graph API
Profile feed (Wall)	limited ^b	✓ Graph API
Photo Albums	limited ^b	✓ Graph API
Video Uploads	limited ^b	✓ Graph API
Messages	limited ^b	✓ Graph API

^a No additional information available.
^b Missing meta-information such as UIDs.





Order of Volatility

- „Order of Volatility“ – RFC 3227:
 - registers, cache
 - routing table, arp cache, process table, kernel statistics,
 - memory
 - temporary file systems
 - disk
 - remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the system in question
 - physical configuration, network topology
 - archival media
- <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3227.txt>



Order of Volatility

- „Order of Volatility“ - NIST 800-86
 - Network connections
 - Login sessions
 - Contents of memory
 - Running processes
 - Open files
 - Network configuration
 - Operating system time
- <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-86/SP800-86.pdf>



Challenges with Acquisition

- dead man's control: shutdown, reboot
- Running rootkit
- OS logging – modify settings or not?
- Computer runs but locked
- Shutdown or pull the plug?
- Key remapping
- Superuser or user-level access?
- Pre-incident installation
- ...



Challenges with Acquisition

- Documentation!
 - In which state was the computer encountered?
 - What did you do?
 - Which software did you use? (exact versions!)
 - Which data did you copy to which location?
 - Hash values



Challenges with Acquisition

- Acquisition – Hardware vs. Software:
 - Software cheap but modifies state
 - Software can be tricked (kernel level Rootkit)
 - Hardware access requires additional hardware (DMA), such as Firewire, PCI, or PCMCIA
 - Hardware OS independent
 - Hardware can also be tricked (Rutkowska, BH 2007)
- There is no perfect answer!



Challenges with Acquisition

- Acquisition of virtual machines:
 - Suspend VMWare, copy *.vmem* file
- Windows Hibernation files
 - hiberfil.sys: switch to Hibernation Mode, copy file from hard disk
 - Not possible with Windows XP > 4 GB RAM






RAM Acquisition

- Image File Formats:
 - Raw – mit *dd* 1:1 image
 - Dumpfiles *.dmp* – CPU States information, required for Microsoft Tools
- Tools for Acquisition:
 - Kntdd – physical memory evidence from Microsoft Windows (XP, Win7, Win8)
 - Windd – disk dump
 - (Almost) all vendors (Encase, FTK, ...) have free utilities or Live CDs such as *FTK Imager*

RAM Acquisition

- Example for Windows – **NOT** good:
 - psexec \\target –u Administrator –p password dd.exe if=\\.\\PhysicalDrive0 of=\\.\\mymachine\\share \\$\\target.drive0.dd bs=8k conv=noerroe
 - \\.\\PhysicalDriveX are hard disks
 - \\.\\PhysicalMemory is RAM
 - Better use FTK Imager
 - Source www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-jp-06/BH-JP-06-Bilby-up.pdf (Low Down and Dirty: Anti-forensic Rootkits - Black Hat)





Cold Boot Attack


- *Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys*, USENIX Security Symposium 2008
- Access RAM
 - Originally designed to capture crypto keys
 - Also useful for forensics (Screen locked, no USB, CD drive, investigator cannot start any external application)
 - Requires physical access

Windows RAM

- List of processes:
 - In Windows: all processes are in double chained list
 - Processes are objects
 - PsActiveProcessHead points to first element
 - Iterate shows all processes
 - Problem: root kits can modify the chain and make themselves invisible
 - What to do: scan entire memory; slow, specific of OS, difficult to do


Windows RAM

Enumeration of processes



Windows RAM

- Antiforensics: DKOM manipulation (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation)



Windows RAM

- Timeline can be generated after RAM has been saved
 - Threads & processes: created, terminated
 - Registry: last modification
 - Sockets: time of creation
 - Objects: almost everything (in Windows)!:
 - File objects, Symlink Objects, Mutex, ...

Windows RAM

- Tools you can use:
 - FTK 3
 - EnCase
 - ...
- Open Source:
 - *Volatility!*



Windows RAM

- *Volatility*:
 - For Windows XP, Vista, 7, Server 2003 & 2008
 - www.volatilesystems.com/default/volatility
 - Available for EnCase
- *ptfinder*:
 - Original by Andreas Schuster
 - Development was continued for 2008 Server & Windows 7

Windows RAM

- Volatility – selected commands:
 - strt: „*python vol.py commands*“ or. „*python volatility commands*“
 - Convert images : *imagecopy*
 - Threads: *thrdscan*
 - Processes: *pslist*, *psscan*, *pstree*, *procexecdump*, *procmemdump*
 - Drivers: *driverscan*
 - Files: *filescan*
 - Sockets: *sockets*, *sockscan*
 - Connections: *connections*, *connscan*, *netscan*

RESEARCH IDEAS



And even more challenges Data Provenance Challenges

- Privacy
 - Combining different data sources (e.g. reading habits, diets)
 - Ambiguity of data and incorrect conclusions
- Security
 - Data and provenance do not share the same access policy
 - Detecting fake or fabricated records
- Object removal
 - How to preserve ancestral relation?
- Minimization
 - Provenance can get much bigger than actual data
 - Storing provenance costs
 - Even when minimized, has to be updated, queried, used

Questions?

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